Publications
The Limits of Information Capacity: Evidence from the French Napoleonic Cadaster. Accepted at Comparative Political Studies
Draft
To what extent do large state-led investments in information capacity – legibility – promote fiscal revenue? I argue that in unstable political conditions, the effects of legibility may be limited to the local level. I analyze the French Napoleonic cadaster, an ambitious land survey designed to rationalize taxation following the 1789 revolution. From initial centralization, the process was decentralized after the fall of the empire in 1815. Exploiting variation in cadastral operations over forty years of implementation, I show that legibility did not increase fiscal revenue at the aggregate level, and even reduced it in the short run. In the long run, I find positive local effects of the centralized cadaster on fiscal revenue. Legibility also facilitated public works and shifts in the management of communal land. The cadaster thus failed an instrument of broad fiscal reform but arguably strengthened the state’s reach at the local level.
Local rule, Elites, and Popular Grievances: Evidence from Ancien Régime France. Journal of Historical Political Economy. Vol. 3: No. 1, pp 1-29. May 17, 2023.
Article
In an authoritarian state, are citizens better-off when governed by local rulers or the central state? Local rulers have better information on local conditions than central officials and may be more accountable to citizens, but when left unchecked by the central state, elites can also use their power at the expense of the general population. I analyze French Ancien Regime provincial institutions representing local elites, which levied taxation in a third of the territory. I leverage data on living standards, popular rebellions and grievance lists to measure distinct dimensions of the general population’s welfare. Local rule had no clear impact on living standards but improved satisfaction with some limited aspects of taxation. Further, there is evidence of increased rent-seeking by local elites, suggesting that lower central oversight of local elites had detrimental consequences for peasants. Overall, local rule controlled by elites made little difference for most citizens.
Working papers
Peasants into Citizens: Suffrage Expansion and the Rise of Mass Politics (with Alejandro López Peceño and Arturas Rozenas). R&R at World Politics
Draft
The concurrent rise of mass politics and democratic institutions represent two major global political trends of the past two centuries. We examine the relationship between these historical developments by investigating how voting rights have influenced mass political mobilization. Utilizing the discontinuous variation in suffrage levels in the French local elections during the July Monarchy (1830-1848), we find that broader suffrage increased political interest, collective mobilization, and opposition to autocracy. Even when introduced and practiced within an authoritarian system, the right to vote facilitates the development of a pro-democratic mass public.
In progress
War, Fiscal Administration and Centralization: Evidence from Early Modern France. (with Ronan Tallec).
Does the emergence of wartime fiscal administration strengthen centralization in a weak state? We analyze the emergence of the fiscal state in late medieval France, collecting novel data on fiscal office-holders and royal power during and after the Hundred Year War. We show that war led to the emergence of an early fiscal administration reaching beyond the feudal domain. However this centralization was compensated by the decentralization of territorial governance to the high nobility. Princes developed and exploited the royal fiscal system to their benefit when the king was weak, but opposed it when the king became stronger. While the nobility was strengthened, the bargaining power of towns receded.
Violence, Inequality, and the Unraveling of Democracy: Evidence from the French Second Republic. (with Nadim Farhat and Brenda Von Coppenolle).
How do conservative elites vote when they control the legislative branch in a nascent democratic regime? Do they attempt to install an authoritarian leader or do they attempt to use suffrage to their advantage? Analyzing the case of the French Second Republic (1848-1851)- Europe’s first experiment with universal male suffrage followed by swift backsliding, we combine original roll-call data on eight anti-republican laws on both suffrage and civil liberties with information on local unrest and economic structure. We show that unrest increases support for suffrage restrictions in egalitarian, small-holder departments but dampens it where large landowners dominate the countryside. This suggests that elites’ attitudes toward suffrage depended on their capacity to control peasants’ vote, and that in that context universal suffrage was compatible with support for strong repression of civil liberties.
Land, Legibility and Revolution: Evidence from the Milliard des Emigrés.
The clarification of property rights, or their legibility, is considered a key aspect of economic and political development. However, unresolved land conflict can hinder this process, especially when dispossessed elites return to power. Financial compensation is a potential solution, but at the cost of fiscal capacity. I analyze the case of revolutionary land confiscations of noble emigrates’ land, collecting detailed canton-level information on the extent of noble emigration, and combining it with data on gradual cadastral development. I show that the settlement of revolutionary land confiscations under the restored Bourbon monarchy promoted the creation of local cadasters after 1825. This suggests that the legacy of revolutionary policies constrainted subsequent state-building.
Forests, Conservation and Conflict: Evidence from 19th century France.
What are the consequences of historical state intervention in environmental conservation? Deforestation was a major issue in early 19th century France, and politicians viewed the excess use of communal land as its main cause. In 1827, the state passed a Forest code which limited longstanding use rights on most forests. The law led to major revolts in several forested regions of France, where peasants relied on these rights to complement their income. Using detailed data on forest geography and the gradual application of the Forest code, I show the impact of state intervention in forest conservation on local development, compliance with the law and revolts against state authority.
Social Solidarity during the Great Depression: Did immigration hinder the development of municipal unemployment funds? (with Charlotte Cavaillé and Victor Gay).
Research shows that opposition to policies that redistribute across racial and ethnic divides affected the formation of the American welfare state. Were similar dynamics at play in France during the interwar period? To answer this question, we focus on the relationship between immigration and social solidarity during the Great Depression. We examine whether the presence of a large immigrant population hindered the creation of municipal unemployment funds aimed at meeting the needs of a growing contingent of able-bodied workers unable to find work.
Old projects:
“Inequality and the State-society Conflict: A Simple Model of Divide and Rule”.
“State, Roads, and Coerced Labor: Evidence from the French Corvee System”.